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Abstract
The method of decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) requests different intensities of light
pulses. Existing theory has assumed exact control of intensities. Here we propose a simple protocol
which is secure and efficient even there are errors in intensity control. In our protocol, decoy pulses
and signal pulses are generated from the same father pulses with a two-value attenuation. Given the
upper bound of fluctuation of the father pulses, our protocol is secure provided that the two-value
attenuation is done exactly. We propose to use unbalanced beam-splitters for a stable attenuation.
Given that the intensity error is bounded by ±5%, with the same key rate, our method can achieve
a secure distance only 1 km shorter than that of an ideal protocol with exactly controlled source.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
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Recently, some methods[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] have been proposed for secure quantum
key distribution (QKD)[10, 11, 12] with coherent states[13, 14, 15]. One of these methods is
the so called decoy-state method[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] where Alice randomly changes the intensity
of her pulses among a few values (e.g., 3 values: 0, µ and µ′) or infinite values and then
she can verify the fraction of single-photon counts in the raw key. With this information, a
secure final key can be distilled by using the separate theoretical results[16].
So far a number of experiments on decoy-state QKD have been done[17, 18, 19], in optical
fiber or in free space, in polarization space or with phase-coding. However, the existing
theory of decoy-state method assumes the exact control of pulse intensities. A problem met
in practice is how to carry out the decoy-state method efficiently given the inexact control
of pulse intensity. As we have shown[20], actually, one can verify the single-photon counts
rather efficiently with simple tomography even though the intensity fluctuations of each
light pulses are large. However, doing it in that way Alice needs additional operation of
tomography. Here we present a simpler protocol for decoy-state method QKD.
Here we shall consider the effects of inexact control of µ, µ′ in a decoy-state protocol
requesting 3 intensities, {0, µ, µ′}. (Actually, all decoy-state protocols with a few intensities,
e.g., 2 or 4 intensities[3, 5] have the same basic problem of inexact control of µ, µ′.) For
clarity, lets first consider an ideal protocol with exact intensity control, as shown in Fig. 1:a).
At any time t, if Alice wants to send a pulse of intensity µ or µ′, she first produces a father
pulse of intensity Ω. After that she attenuates the pulse by A(t) = µ/Ω or A(t) = µ′/Ω
randomly and a pulse of intensity µ or µ′ is produced randomly and sent out to Bob. In
this ideal protocol, Both Ω and A(t) are controlled exactly.
For practical use, we propose a similar protocol as shown in Fig. 1:b). Alice wants to
produce an intensity Ω for the father pulse. She then takes the same random attenuations
as that in the ideal protocol. Here we assume that Alice can control the attenuation factors
of A(t) exactly (either µ/Ω or µ′/Ω) but she can not control Ω exactly. ( To control the
instantaneous attenuation A(t) exactly we can use unbalanced beam-splitters as we are going
to show.) At each time, she has actually produced intensities of {Ωt} for the father pulses.
Although we can never control the intensity exactly, by our currently existing technology,
we can definitely control the intensity in a small range, say, e.g., controlling the fluctuation
within ±5% of Ω. That is to say, Alice knows the upper-bound of {Ωt}. We denote such an
upper bound value as ΩM .
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Given this upper-bound value ΩM , the set-up in Fig. 1:b) is equivalent to a virtual set-up
as shown in Fig. 2:a). In the virtual protocol shown in Fig. 2:a), every time a father pulse
of constant intensity ΩM is first produced and then the pulse is attenuated randomly, with
attenuation factors of A′(t) = Ωt
ΩM
. Alice cannot control this A′(t). After this attenuation,
a pulse of intensity Ωt is produced. Note that A
′(t) is independent of µ, µ′, since we can
imagine that Alice decides to use µ or µ′ after the attenuation A′(t). Since all attenuators
are inside Alice’s Lab., it makes no difference if Alice exchanges the order of attenuators
A(t) and A′(t). The physical meaning of order exchange is that Alice first decides to use
µ or µ′ and then arrange the attenuation A′(t) which is independent of Alice’s decision of
using µ or µ′. This is just the virtual protocol in Fig. 2:b). In Fig. 2:b), after the pulse
passes A(t) but before passes A′(t), the intensity should be either µ˜ = µ
Ω
ΩM or µ˜
′ = µ
′
Ω
ΩM
exactly. That is to say, during the virtual stage between A(t) and A′(t), the light intensities
of each pulses are either exactly µ˜ or exactly µ˜′. But after a pulse passes through A′(t),
the intensity is changed to inexact values of µi or µ
′
i. For the security proof of the real
set-up in Fig. 1:b), we show the following lemma first. Lemma: The set-up in Fig. 2:b)
is unconditionally secure if Alice regards it as a 3-intensity decoy-state protocol with each
light intensities being randomly chosen from {0, µ˜, µ˜′}.
Proof: First we suppose Eve controls A′(t). The dashed square can be regarded as an exact
source for a decoy-state protocol using intensities 0, µ˜, µ˜′. As it has been known already,
decoy-state method with exact intensity control is secure given whatever channel. Here what
Eve can do is first using A′(t) for attenuation and then do whatever. This is only a type
of specific channel therefore cannot be used to cheat Alice and Bob. In the set-up of Fig.
2:b), actually the attenuator A′(t) is not controlled by Eve, definitely the set-up is secure
because Eve cannot attack the protocol better with her power being reduced. Alternatively,
we imagine that A′(t) is controlled by Alice’s friend, Clare. If Alice choose to disregard
Clare’s existence then to Alice this is just a decoy-state protocol with exactly controlled
intensities of µ˜, µ˜′.
Given this lemma, we immediately have the theorem: The set-up shown in Fig. 1:b) is
unconditionally secure even though there are intensity fluctuations in values µ, µ′ if: 1) the
values of {Ωt} are upper-bounded by ΩM ; 2) attenuation A(t) is exactly controlled; 3) Alice
assumes that she had used exact intensities of {0, µΩM
Ω
, µ′ΩM
Ω
} in calculating the fraction of
single-photon counts and distilling the final key.
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The proof is simply that the final light pulses produced in Fig. 1:b) and final light pulses
produced in Fig. 2:b) are identical. While the scheme in Fig. 2:b) has been proven to be
secure by our Lemma.
The question remaining is then how to make stable attenuations A(t) used above. We
can realize A(t) by beam-splitters as shown in Fig.(3). First, we attenuate each father pulses
(Ωt) by a fixed attenuation factor of A0 =
µ+µ′
Ω
. (A0 can be realized by an unbalanced beam-
splitter.) Second, after this A0 attenuation, we split the beam by a µ : µ
′ beam-splitter and
then either the transmitted beam b or the reflected beam b′ will be blocked and the other
one will be guided to the optical fiber and sent to Bob.
Suppose the ideal protocol with parameters µe, µ
′
e would produce a good key rate in a
certain experimental condition. Alice can try to use any intensities around µe, µ
′
e and then
assumes that she had used larger intensities for security. One good choice is that Alice tries
to produce {0, µe/λ, µ
′
e/λ} with λ = ΩM/Ω for quantum communication with Bob and then
assumes to have used {0, µe, µ
′
e}. For simplicity, we shall only consider this option hereafter.
The actual efficiency of the protocol can be concluded by a real experiment. But we
can still roughly estimate the efficiency theoretically on what should be found if we did the
experiment. One can calculate the final key rate[5, 16] if he knows fraction of single-photon
counts and the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
We consider the normal case where there is no Eve. and the channel transmittance is
linear. We shall first compare the key rate of the following two protocols: our protocol with
channel transmittance η (protocol P (η)) and the ideal protocol with channel transmittance
η/λ (protocol P0(η/λ)). In both protocols they will assume exact values 0, µe, µ
′
e in the
calculation of single-photon counts and final key distillation. However, in protocol P (η),
Alice had done her best to produce 0, µe/λ, µ
′
e/λ for quantum communication. In both
protocols, Alice and Bob can find the values of Sµe = 1− e
−ηµe/λ + dB, Sµ′e = 1− e
−ηµ′e/λ +
dB as the counting rates (yields) of pulses of intensities (or assumed intensities) of µe, µ
′
e,
respectively, where dB is the dark count rate of Bob’s detector. We have the following joint
equations[2] to calculate the single-photon transmittance for both protocols:
e−µes0 + µee
−µes1 + csc = Sµe ;
e−µ
′
es′0 + µ
′
ee
−µ′es′1 +
(
µ′e
µe
)2
eµe−µ
′
es′c ≤ Sµ′e
(1)
Here c = 1 − e−µe − µee
−µe . Parameters of sx are counting rates for states |x〉〈x| from x
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pulses (x = 0, 1), sc is the counting rates of state ρc (state of those multi-photon pulses)
from µe pulses. Parameters s
′
x are counting rates of the same state as defined for sx, but
they are for those states from µ′e pulses only. The values of s0, s
′
0 can be deduced from the
observed counting rate of those vacuum pulses. (For the two-intensity protocol[5]), one can
assume s0 = s
′
0 = 0 for the minimum key rate.) Asymptotically, sx = s
′
x, sc = s
′
c. Given a
finite number of pulses, sx and s
′
x can be a bit different but their possible range of difference
can be bounded by classical statistics[2, 3, 5] with exponential certainty therefore minimum
values of s1, s
′
1 can be calculated numerically. Since s1, s
′
1 values for both protocols are
calculated from the same equations with same parameters, the value of verified single-photon
transmittance (s1, s
′
1) of our protocol P (η) is equal to that of the ideal protocol P0(η/λ).
This indicates that the two protocols should have the same fraction of single-photon counts
for each intensity.
We use notation E,E ′ for the observed error rates of pulses of intensity µe, µ
′
e, respectively.
If they are determined by dark counts, alignment error and transmission error, these values
and the deduced value of single-photon QBER in our protocol should be the same with (or
a bit less than) those of the ideal protocol P0(η/λ).
Given all these values requested for the final key distillation are the same for the two
protocols, we conclude that that the key rate of our protocol P (η) is the same with that of
the ideal protocol P0(η/λ). In the case that the intensity fluctuation is bounded by 5% in our
protocol (i.e., λ = 1.05) and the light intensity decreases by a half for every 15 kms in both
protocols, the QKD distance of our protocol is only shorter than that of the ideal protocol
by less than 1.06 km if we request the same key rate for two protocols. Similar calculation
shows that even the maximum fluctuation is 20%, the shortened distance is less than 4 kms.
This shows that the secure distance of currently existing experiments[18, 19] would keep
on exceeding 100 kms if they had used the proposed method here. Since currently existing
experimental results[18, 19] have not adopted our protocol (producing different intensities
from the same laser device with attenuation), it should be interesting to redo the decoy-state
QKD experiment using our protocol for a securer result.
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FIG. 1: a) The ideal protocol that Alice can produce constant intensity Ω for the father pulse
therefore intensity µ, µ′ are controlled exactly. b) The real protocol used in practice. At each time,
Alice wants to produce intensity Ω for the father pulse, however, she actually produces {Ωt} at
each time t. Consequently, the intensities of output pulses are {µi}, {µ
′
i}. We assume that Alice
can control the attenuator A(t) exactly in a real protocol. After a father pulse is produced, Alice
randomly choose the attenuation factor by A(t) = µ/Ω or A(t) = µ′/Ω. Here the subscript t is
from 1 to N +N ′, subscript i for {µi} is from 1 to N , subscript i for {µ
′
i} is from 1 to N
′.
A(t)A (t)'
A (t)'A(t)
μ μ 'i ior
ΩM
Alice
Bob
Alice
Bob
a) b)
ΩM
μ μ 'i ior
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FIG. 2: Equivalent virtual protocols. Our real protocol in Fig. 1:b) is equivalent to a virtual
protocol as shown in part a) of this figure. Here Alice first produces a constant intensity ΩM for
each father pulses and then attenuates each of them by attenuator A′(t). After A′(t), the pulse
intensity is Ωt. It makes no difference to the output light if we exchange the order of A(t) and
A′(t), therefore a) is equivalent to b). In part b), we can also regard the dashed square as our
source and A′(t) as part of the channel.
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FIG. 3: Realizing A(t) by unbalanced beam-splitters. A0 : a constant attenuator with attenuation
factor µ+µ
′
Ω
, this can be realized by an unbalanced beam-splitter. BS: a µ : µ′ beam-splitter. OS:
optical switcher. OF: optical fiber.
9
